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THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING A FEDERAL TAKEOVER OF
A PRIVATELY-RUN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
A federal takeover of a private financial institution is a controversial
move by a government founded on capitalistic principals, and perhaps an
illegal attempt by the government to control private industry. Section 13(3) of
the Federal Reserve Act allows the Federal Reserve to extend financial
assistance to troubled companies under certain conditions.' Under the claimed
authority from this section, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), part
of the executive branch of the United States Government, seized control of
American International Group (AIG) on Wednesday, September 17, 2008, in
an $85 billion deal.2 This takeover is allegedly justified in light of the chaotic
economic conditions and potentially devastating consequences of allowing
AIG to fail.3 The takeover effectively puts the federal government, which used
taxpayer dollars to finance this transaction without prior direct congressional
action, in control of a privately owned company.4 Such a direct and drastic
move has never been conducted, and it is likely that the Federal Reserve has
exceeded the authority granted to it by Congress under section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act.5 Even if the takeover of AIG was authorized by section
13(3), the FOMC and AIG have not shown evidence that proper procedural
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guidelines, such as a ten day notice to shareholders of AIG before the issuance
of convertible preferred stock, were followed.6 While it is too early for the
outcome of this takeover to be determined, lawsuits challenging the bailout are
currently being filed by AIG shareholders whose equity stakes in the company
have mostly been eliminated by the massive dilution of AIG's shares
following the takeover.7 Before evaluating AIG's bailout, it is important to
first understand who AIG is in order to appreciate why this bailout occurred.
II. WHO IS AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP AND WHAT Do
THEY Do?
American International Group is one of the world's largest insurers. 8 It
operates in more than 130 countries worldwide and is especially active in
Britain as the top seller of investment bonds. 9 Many individuals across the
world have purchased travel, life, or household insurance coverage from
AIG. 10 However, AIG's insurance products are not limited to these traditional
insurance packages, and include a wide array of complex financial instruments
that are structured for commercial banks, investment banks, and hedge funds
around the globe." AIG's insurance on certain bonds, American mortgages,
and mortgage-backed securities are of particular concern to the current
economic crisis. 2 These insurance products are known as credit default swaps
(CDS), many of which are directly or indirectly linked to the value of U.S.
mortgages. 13
Credit default swaps are insurance against default on risky assets, such
as defaults on bonds and other debt instruments. 1 4 Major bond holders often
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purchase CDS to protect themselves against the risk of debtor's failure.15
While the cost of purchasing CDS from a third party provider lowers the
overall expected rate of return on a bond (not the bond's coupon rate, but the
actual realized rate of return after subtracting the cost of the CDS from the
bond coupon payments), it also substantially lowers the risk to the investor,
assuming the insurance provider is still solvent at the time of default. 16 This
allows bond investors to purchase higher yielding bonds (those with more
inherent risk, and thus a built in higher coupon rate) and simultaneously
purchase insurance against their default. 17 This practice often results in a
higher overall return, despite the cost of the CDS, than the bond investor
would have made by purchasing a safer, more traditional bond in the first
place. 8 Thus, CDS provide an incentive for institutional investors to purchase
riskier assets than they otherwise would.' 9 Since the investor will be insured in
the event of default, the default risk of the debtor is no longer a primary
concern.20 Rather, the institutional investor's goal is to achieve the highest
coupon payment possible against the lowest cost of the CDS, disregarding risk
valuation all together.21 As a corollary of this, the CDS issuer should realize
that these insurance products are usually only purchased for investments in
which the investor believes there is a substantial risk of default.
22
Insurance companies, like AIG, must maintain adequate capital
reserves in order to meet the insurance claims of their customers.23 In fact,
insurance companies are regulated by state law with respect to minimum
capital reserve levels.24 A primary method of obtaining these funds is for the
insurance company to offer deposit services in addition to saving the coupon
payments their customers pay to them for the insurance coverage. 25 They may
also offer hybrid insurance and savings plans, such as whole life insurance.26
15 Id.
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Often, insurance companies will be a subsidiary of a much larger financial
company, and have guaranteed access to a pool of funds from other owned
subsidiaries, such as a sister commercial bank subsidiary in the same holding
company as the insurance provider.27 Regardless of how the insurance
company generates these funds, it is essential that their capital reserves are
adequate to pay off valid insurance claims. 28 The alternative is bankruptcy,
which leaves the insurance companies' insured customers out of luck on any
coverage claims they may make.2 9 Thus, when the CDS issuer files for
bankruptcy, suddenly the magnitude of risk on an institutional investor's
portfolio of CDS-insured assets skyrockets.30
AIG treated their CDS business the same as it treated their other
insurance products: by betting that they will only have a few isolated claims at
a time. 3 For example, with traditional homeowner's insurance, when one
customer's home burned down, the likelihood of the remaining customer's
homes burning was not significantly increased.32 Thus, applying data collected
over the years and appropriate risk management practices, the insurer can
calculate a suitable amount of capital reserve to maintain in order to pay off
these sporadic and isolated claims.33 However, this fundamental capital
requirement calculation does not apply to bond insurance, where defaults
traditionally function in a domino-like scheme.34 With bonds, one default can
create a domino effect of failures because investors lose confidence in the
market, interest rates fluctuate dramatically, and depository institutions
become unable to find new capital to stay afloat as investors panic and
withdraw their funds for safer havens. 35 Furthermore, bond defaults occur
much more often in weak economic climates, when companies struggle with
revenues and are unable to meet current cash demands.36 Such a weak
economic climate was present during AIG's collapse.
III. THE ECONOMIC CLIMATE AT THE TIME OF AIG's BAILOUT: CRISIS
Part of the claimed justification, and more importantly, claimed
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conditions of the company and the general market at the time of the takeover.3 7
Therefore, it is necessary to understand the events leading up to the credit
crisis, as well at the crippled state of the market at the time of AIG's bailout.
The week of September 15, 2008 was one of the most dramatic and
unusual weeks in history for Wall Street, and in particular, for financial
companies.3 8 Prior to this week, Wall Street had been battling to control a very
serious credit crisis. 39 This crisis began in the subprime housing industry. 40 For
several years prior to the subprime meltdown, the United States had
experienced an ever expanding housing bubble, with rapid rises in home prices
and decreased lending standards due in part to the securitization (and
accompanying shift of default risk) of subprime mortgages away from the loan
issuer.41 With default risk now shifted away from the lender's own balance
sheets, lenders profited by making as many loans as possible (lender's profit
was derived from the spread between the costs of originally issuing the loan
and the price investors, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were willing to
pay for the right to collect the payments on those loans), rather than making as
many quality loans as possible.42
In addition to the problems created by the lessened lending standards,
buyers wrongly assumed that home prices would continue to climb, and that
they could refinance their homes with more favorable rates before their
adjustable rate mortgages (ARM's) reset to a higher rate (an ARM is a
mortgage which is traditionally characterized by a very low fixed initial
interest rate which later resets to a variable rate that is often several times
higher than the intro rate).43 Alt A, Option ARMs, Interest Only, and Negam
ARM's were several popular and exceptionally risky versions of the traditional
adjustable rate mortgages that were also introduced.44 These mortgage
variations allowed borrowers to choose to pay less than the full amount of
interest due, with the remaining interest owed to be added onto the outstanding
37 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill is Sold, NEW YORK
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/1 5lehman.html?pagewanted=all.38 Id.
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principal balance.45 In this situation, the principal balance owed on the
mortgage actually grew over time, causing future payments to increase even if
the initial adjustable interest rate on the mortgage remained constant.46 Many,
if not most, buyers lacked sufficient understanding for how these risky
variations of ARM's worked.47
Eventually, home prices stopped their skyward climb, and many
borrowers were unable to refinance at a lower interest rate. 48 With ARM's
resetting to interest rates several times higher than their intro-teaser rates, and
in cases of Interest Only and Negam ARM's, payments on principal becoming
due, a wave of defaults began to spread across the subprime industry.49 These
defaults hurt the owners (financial companies such as Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, Lehman Brothers, Bear Steams, AIG, and Merrill Lynch) of these
securitized mortgages, known as mortgage-backed securities (MBS). 50 The
largest owners of mortgage debt, although supposedly not subprime
mortgages, were Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 51 These federally chartered
companies owned 80% of the market share of outstanding mortgage debt
totaling $5.4 trillion.5 2 As such, they were the first companies to become
crippled by the housing bust. On September 7, 2008, the federal government
was forced to bail out and take over the mortgage giants.53 This bailout put
taxpayers on the line for up to $200 billion in write-downs and costs, with the
result of the government now backing over $5 trillion of home loans across
America.54
After several months of balance sheet write-downs from the subprime
meltdown totaling over $400 billion,55 many Wall Street financial companies
were ready to implode.56 Bear Stearns was the first investment bank to fail,
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assisted sale.57 This sale afforded a purchase price of $2 per share, which was
less than 10% of Bear Steams' market value, and grossly lower than its
January 2007 high stock price of $172 per share.58 Bear Steams was only the
beginning. After the renowned investment bank's failure in mid-March of
2008, market conditions continued to deteriorate over the next few months5 9
The week of September 15, 2008 started out with two of the largest
investment banks in the world failing.60 Lehman Brothers was forced to
declare bankruptcy, and Merrill Lynch was frantically sold to Bank of
America for $50 billion in order to prevent another bankruptcy. 6' By Tuesday,
September 16, 2008, there were growing concerns about the nation's largest
savings and loan bank, Washington Mutual, failing.62 (Washington Mutual did
collapse the following week on September 25, 2008. It was seized by the
government, and sold to JPMorgan Chase for $1.9 billion 63 ). To make matters
much worse, New York Governor David Patterson said that AIG had one day
to raise up to $80 billion to stave off bankruptcy. 64 Without immediate federal
intervention, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch would not have been the last
financial corporations to fail that week.65
IV. WHY AIG's TAKEOVER WAS BELIEVED TO BE NECESSARY
Some government officials adamantly believed that a federal takeover
of AIG was necessary to prevent a devastating blow to America's financial
system. 66 A simple explanation would be that AIG was too big to fail.
67
Perhaps the most important reason why the AIG bailout was thought to be
necessary was because of the impact that AIG's insolvency would have on the
57 Matthew Goldstein, JPMorgan Buys Bear on the Cheap, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar.
16, 2008, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/mar2008/db20080316_356
646.htm.58 id.
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purchasers of its credit default swaps.68 Without insurance on the assets
backed by these CDS, institutional investors would immediately be exposed to
incredibly higher risk levels on their investments. 69 In order to lower that risk,
institutional investors would have to conduct a massive selloff of risky assets
in a market with few capable buyers.70 Underlying asset prices and stock
market valuations would plummet in the face of this selloff.71 The sell-off and
supply dump would then start a chain effect that would cause safer assets to
decrease in value, affecting smaller and individual investors who didn't even
rely on CDS.72 In short, an incalculable chaos was feared. 3 The Federal
Reserve officials concluded that immediate federal intervention was needed,
and that there was no time to wait for Congress to act.74
Another reason the Federal Reserve decided to bail out AIG appears to
be out of a concern that the Wall Street financial crisis could infiltrate
traditionally safe investments held by small investors, such as money market
funds.75 If this happened, a panic to withdraw cash from these funds would
have been likely to occur, further crippling financial companies who were
76
already in desperate need of cash for capital reserve requirements.
The specific link from AIG to money market funds is that much of
AIG's own commercial paper and short-term debt obligations were being held
by these money market accounts.77 Indeed, this worry was validated on the day
before AIG's bailout, as three reserve money market funds "broke the buck."
(Assets held in money market funds are traditionally considered very safe,
short-term investments, and are valued at $1 for every $1 invested. When the
valuation of such funds declines below $1, an event referenced to as "breaking
the buck," the concern is that some of the debt obligations that the fund holds
will not make good on their notes. 78 )
As Lehman Brothers, Inc. declared bankruptcy on Monday, September
15, 2008, 7 investors contemplated the further defaults and fund devaluation
that would be caused in the event of the bankruptcy of one of the largest
insurers in the world-AIG. At this point, the Federal Reserve had all the
evidence that a federal intervention was needed in order to prevent a panic and
68 NPR, supra note 14.
69 id.
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withdrawal spree on these money market accounts, which would further injure
an already crippled financial sector .80 However, their approach may not have
been the most appropriate one available.
V. THE HYPOTHETICALLY APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO THE AIG
BAILOUT
Ideally, the proper way to structure AIG's bailout would have been
conducted with terms that Congress created and approved, for it is within
Congress that the powers of spending taxpayers' monies are vested. 8' After
congressional approval, the President would then sign off on the bill or veto it,
sending it back to Congress to be approved only with a two-thirds
supermajority. 82 Under this course of action, the claims of unauthorized
spending of taxpayer monies would be eliminated, and any challenges to the
bailout would have to be made on a constitutional level.
Unfortunately, congressional leaders lacked both the speed and skill
necessary to act quickly enough to prevent AIG's bankruptcy. 83 If the Federal
Reserve had not stepped in and acted, it is a near certainty that AIG would
have been forced into bankruptcy.84 Necessity, however, does not equate to
legality, and the fact that AIG could only have been saved by the Federal
Reserve is not a justification that grants authority to the Federal Reserve to
save AIG with an unprecedented loan to a private financial corporation. In
order for the Federal Reserve's bailout of AIG to be valid, the Federal Reserve
must have been granted authority to act by Congress.85
Congress may ratify the Federal Reserve's actions by creating and
approving a bill that mimics the actions that were taken by the Federal
Reserve. However, this does not necessarily cure the infirmities of the Federal
Reserve's initial, unauthorized, and potentially unconstitutional action.
Regardless of ratification and subsequent action by Congress, AIG's
shareholders still have valid claims against the Federal Reserve's actions. A
post ante endorsement by Congress does not void these claims. Despite these
concerns, the Federal Reserve proceeded to bail out AIG on Wednesday,
September 17, 2008.
80 Kamitschnig, supra note 3.
81 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
82 Robert Longley, About the Presidential Veto, About.com US Government Info,
http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/thepresidentandcabinet/a/presveto.htm.
83 Ted Barrett, et al., AIG bailout upsets Republican lawmakers, CNN
POLITICS.COM, Sept. 17, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/09/17/aig.bailout.congress/index.html.
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Handbook for Congress, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb 105-
4.html.
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VI. DETAILS OF THE ACTUAL TAKEOVER:
$85 BILLION IS EXCHANGED FOR A 79.9% CONTROLLING
STAKE IN AIG
On Wednesday, September 17, 2008, the federal government seized
control of American International Group Inc. in an $85 billion deal.86 In
exchange for $500,000 and extending the $85 billion loan, the United States
government will receive 100,000 shares of AIG convertible participating serial
preferred stock.87 Under the terms of this deal, the Federal Open Market
Committee will lend up to $85 billion to AIG in exchange for a 79.9% equity
stake in the company in the form of warrants called equity participation
notes. 88 This equity stake will entitle the government to 79.9% of any
dividends that are paid on AIG's common stock, as well as 79.9% stake in any
vote, common or otherwise. 89 The government's preferred stock will be
convertible into common shares equaling a 79.9% stake in the common stock
of AIG. 90 However, given the existing rights of the government's preferred
stock, there is essentially no need or gain from this conversion.91 When the
loan is fully paid off, the government's preferred stock will not simply be
returned to AIG, as the government will continue to exercise 79.9% of the
voting power over AIG. 92 While there may be pressure for the government to
sell its shares upon repayment of the loan, there is no formal requirement for
the government to do SO. 9 3 Therefore, for all effective purposes, the
government is at control of the reins of AIG for an indefinite period of time.
A. Size of the Equity Stake, Ownership, and Terms of the Loan
Although several different explanations have been proposed, as of yet
there is no definitive answer for why the equity stake was calculated to
79.9%.94 Most importantly, among the possible explanations is that this
number helps build a case that AIG is not now a government-controlled
entity. 95 If AIG is a government-controlled entity, then the government's
unique accounting rules would have to be adopted, section 163 of the Internal
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aigs-new-bailout/ (Nov. 10, 2008).
95 id.
2009] Is the Government's Takeover of AIG 253
Constitutionally Permissible?
Revenue Code would prevent AIG from deducting interest paid on their loans
from the government, and the government would be jointly and severally
liable for AIG's benefit plan liabilities under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act.96
The preferred shares issued to the government are actually issued to a
trust, of which the Treasury Department is the beneficiary, and not the Federal
Reserve. 97 This way, taxpayers get the benefit of any gain on the equity, rather
than the Federal Reserve itself, which is a privately-owned organization."
With respect to short-term partial repayment, the Federal Reserve will
facilitate a process under which AIG will sell parts of its business enterprise to
competing companies. 99 The Wall Street Journal has reported that AIG is
considering selling up to fifteen of its core and subsidiary businesses,
including its profitable aircraft leasing business, in an attempt to repay a part
of this unprecedented governmental loan.' 00
This loan will have a payback period of two years, maturing on
September 22, 2010, and will carry an interest rate on borrowed balances of
LIBOR plus 8.5%, and 8.5% on money committed but not used.'0o (LIBOR is
the London Interbank Offered Rate, which acts as a common short-term
lending benchmark. 102) At current interest rates, this rate comes out to equal a
crushing 11.5%. 103 In the event of a continued market decline, the Federal
Reserve (and taxpayers as ultimate beneficiaries) will have some protection of
repayment of the loan because it is secured by AIG's assets, including its
subsidiary operations. 104 If market prices recover, taxpayers stand to make a
sizeable profit through the government's equity stake in the company. 
05
B. Control of AIG is Now, For All Effective Purposes, in the Hands
of Uncle Sam
Perhaps the most interesting part of this AIG deal is that it puts the
federal government in control of a private corporation. 06 In the case of AIG's
bailout, the result is that the government, for all practical purposes, owns and
controls a privately held insurance company.'07 A federal reserve bank has no
96 id.
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explicit power to structure this type of transaction, and such a tactic has never
been used before. 1
08
As part of the takeover deal, the Federal Reserve required the then
current chief executive officer, Robert Willumstad, to step down.'0 9 In his
place, Edward Liddy, the former head of insurer Allstate Corp., will become
the chief executive officer of AIG. 10 The government also has tight control
over the composition of AIG's board of directors, as well the corporate
governance standards. "' In essence, the process works like this: taxpayers
elect the President, who appoints the Secretary of Treasury, who appoints the
trustee in control of the government's equity stake in AIG, who appoints the
CEO of AIG and has control over the composition of AIG's board of director's
and corporate governance standards." 2
The government also has the right to veto the payment of dividends to
common and preferred shareholders." 13 Furthermore, under section 2.10 of the
government's loan agreement, essentially all of the net proceeds of any sale,
equity insurance, debt placement, any extraordinary receipt of cash greater
than $1 million, and any excess cash on hand goes toward repayment of the
loan.' ' 4 Thus, the government has an exceptionally tight control on any
meaningful asset or funds distribution, which suggests a general ability, but
perhaps not a right, to control the operations of the entire private
corporation. 5
VII. DOES THE FEDERAL RESERVE HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY FOR THE BAILOUT OF AIG?
There are several potential violations of applicable statutes, laws,
rules, and regulations with respect to the AIG bailout. First, a preliminary
question of whether existing AIG shareholders were entitled to a pre-approval
vote must be answered when examining if the Federal Reserve has authority to
take over AIG in the manner it did. Under New York Stock Exchange Rules
and section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, it is apparent that voting
requirements on this type of transaction were in place. 116 However, it appears
108 Id.
109 Kamitschnig, supra note 3.
"'1 Davidoff, supra note 2.
112 Oesterle, supra note 4.
113 Press Release, supra note 1.
"4 Davidoff, supra note 2.
15 Oesterle, supra note 5.
116 NYSE Listed Company Manual, May, 22 2007, available at
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?nyseref=-http%3A//www.nyse.com/regulation
/nyse/1 182508124422.html&displayPage=/lcm/lcm_section.html.
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these voting requirements were not followed. 117 Even if the voting
requirements were followed, a more difficult question of whether the Federal
Reserve has previously been delegated authority by Congress to act as it did
must be answered. Congress was not involved in the AIG takeover, and the
Federal Reserve's claim that it has been granted authority for the bailout of
AIG under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act is debatable. "8 As AIG is
a Delaware corporation trading on the New York Stock Exchange, Delaware
statutory and case law, as well as the New York Stock Exchange Rules, must
be examined when evaluating the legality of AIG's controversial takeover. "9
A. Under New York Stock Exchange Rules, Were Existing AIG
Stockholders Required to Pre-Approve the Bailout Terms?
New York Stock Exchange Rule 312.03(c)(1) requires shareholder
approval of securities issuances when "the common stock has, or will have
upon issuance, voting power equal to or in excess of 20% of the voting power
outstanding before the issuance of such stock or of securities convertible into
or exercisable for common stock."' 120 There was no shareholder vote prior to
the grant of the preferred shares carrying a 79.9% voting power to the United
States Government. 121 However, NYSE Rule 312.05 contains an exception, on
which the government must rely on. 122 This rule states:
Exceptions may be made to the shareholder approval policy
in Para. 312.03 upon application to the Exchange when (1)
the delay in securing stockholder approval would seriously
jeopardize the financial viability of the enterprise and (2)
reliance by the company on this exception is expressly
approved by the Audit Committee of the Board.
A company relying on this exception must mail to all
shareholders not later than 10 days before issuance of the
securities a letter alerting them to its omission to seek the
shareholder approval that would otherwise be required under
the policy of the Exchange and indicating that the Audit
117 Jef Feeley, AIG Is Sued by Shareholder Over Government Bailout (Update2),
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 5, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aVycplP62daM&refer
=news.
118 Press Release, supra note 1.119 Davidoff, supra note 94.
120 NYSE Manual, supra note 116.
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Committee of the Board has expressly approved the
exception. 113
Even with this exception, however, assuming the delay in securing
stockholder approval would seriouslyjeopardize the financial viability of the
enterprise, there is no evidence that the government notified shareholders not
later than ten days before the equity issuance. 124 In fact, due to the swiftness of
AIG's failure, there was no more than a couple days notice, at most, that AIG
would be subjected to such dire liquidity problems. 125 The first lawsuit on this
issue, Wilma Walker v. American International Group, Inc., was filed in the
Delaware Chancery Court on November 4, 2008.126 Plaintiff shareholder
Wilma Walker claims that the "directors must allow existing shareholders a
separate vote on a bailout provision that gives the government a 79.9% stake
in exchange for $85 billion in loans."' 127 Specifically, Walker seeks to have the
judge disallow the conversion of preferred shares into common stock without a
shareholder vote, and find that the AIG directors erred by agreeing to that part
of the deal. ' 28 However, this case was brought under Delaware law, rather than
under the NYSE rules for listed companies.'
29
B. Does Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act Grant Authority for
the AIG Takeover?
Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution vests the power
to pass laws that spend taxpayers' money in Congress. 130 Congress did not
directly act in the spending of taxpayer's money in the AIG bailout. 13' Rather,
it was the Federal Open Market Committee, part of the executive branch of
government, that made the decision to spend taxpayer money on the bailout of
a privately run financial company without prior, direct congressional approval
for the transaction. 132
As a result of AIG's takeover, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, Henry
Paulson, and the Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, are spending
123 Idr.
124 Frank Reynolds, Suit: AIG Board Broke Del. Law by Barring Vote on $85B
Bailout, ANDREWS PUBLICATIONS, Nov. 7, 2008, available at
http://news.findlaw.com/andrews/bf/dclU20081107/20081107_walker.html.
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126 Feeley, supra note 117.
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130 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8.
131 Mark Hutcherson, Bailout of AIG Is Illegal According To Some Constitutional
Experts, HUTCH REPORT, Sept. 17, 2008, available at
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billions of taxpayer dollars without Congress or the President signing off on
those expenditures. '33 Put another way, this is a situation where a government
agency, which is run by the executive branch of the United States government,
is spending vast sums of taxpayer dollars without Congress first passing an
authorizing law, or delegation of authority, or the President signing his name
to that legislation and taking responsibility for when and how that money is
spent. ' 34 George W. Bush has all but directly said that the President's office
did not have anything to do with the AIG bailout.135 Dana Perino, the White
House Press Secretary for President George W. Bush, has been quoted as
saying "it is more appropriate to describe Bush's role [in the AIG takeover] as
consulting on the move rather than approving it.'
136
The Federal Reserve is claiming that their authority to take over AIG
is granted by the Federal Reserve Act, which allows the Federal Reserve to
lend to non-banks under unusual and exigent circumstances. 137 This same line
of authority was invoked during the rescue of Bear Stearns Co. earlier this
year. ' 38 Specifically, section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act was invoked for
the AIG deal. 139 Section 13(3), titled Discounts for Individuals, Partnerships,
and Corporations provides:
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative
vote of not less than five members, may authorize any
Federal reserve bank, during such periods as the said board
may determine, at rates established in accordance with the
provisions of section 14, subdivision (d), of this Act, to
discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes,
drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills
of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to the
satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank: Provided, That
before discounting any such note, draft, or bill of exchange
for an individual, partnership, or corporation the Federal
reserve bank shall obtain evidence that such individual,
partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit
accommodations from other banking institutions. All such
discounts for individuals, partnerships, or corporations shall
133 id.
134 Id.
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be subject to such limitations, restrictions, and regulations as
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may
prescribe. 
40
From the clear language of section 13(3), there are several conditional
terms that must be satisfied prior to any disbursement made by the Federal
Reserve under authority of this section. '4' First, the conditions for the loan
must arise from "unusual and exigent circumstances."' 142 Given the
aforementioned existing market conditions at the time, no one will argue that
conditions were not unusual and exigent. 43 Second, at least five members of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System must cast a vote in
favor of the disbursement.'" At this time, there is no press release by the
Federal Reserve with details on whether there was a vote, and how that vote
came out. 145 Finally, there is a condition that "before discounting any such
note, draft, or bill of exchange .... the Federal Reserve Bank shall obtain
evidence.. .that [the recipient of the loan] is unable to secure adequate credit
accommodations from other banking institutions."' 146 In normal times, the
private market would be able to come up with a suitable loan for AIG's
liquidity problem. 14 These were not normal times. With the commercial paper
markets frozen, banks hoarding cash, and lenders panicking over their risk
exposure to the credit contagion, AIG was unable to secure funds from private
institutions. 148 It is the position of the Federal Reserve that they were indeed
AIG's last hope of rescue from their liquidity problems. ' 49
After the conditions for disbursement have been met, section 13(3)'s
disbursement power is described as authorization to "discount for any
individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange."50
These terms are of particular importance. Traditionally, "to discount a note" is
to issue a debt obligation at a discount to par value. 15' However, in this
context, "to discount" simply means "to buy." A note is a written promise by
140 Federal Reserve Act, § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006), [hereinafter Federal
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the maker to pay money to the payee. 5 2 A bill of exchange, also known as a
draft, is similar to a note, but involves a middleman (usually a bank).153 With a
bill of exchange or draft, an unconditional order is issued by a drawer (a
person or business) which directs the drawee (the bank) to pay a fixed sum of
money to a payee (a third party). 54 The wording of section 13(3) necessarily
involves a judgment call to determine if market conditions warrant federal
intervention into a privately run company. 55 It is still debatable whether the
requirements for exercising authority under section 13(3) were met prior to the
FOMC exercising power to take over AIG to the detriment of AIG's existing
shareholders. 
15 6
C. Has Section 242(b)(2) of the Delaware General Corporation Law
Been Violated in AIG 's
Takeover?
As part of the takeover of AIG, the government was issued a 79.9%
equity stake in the company. 157 Section 242(b)(2) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law entitles common stockholders to vote as a class respecting
any amendment of a certificate of incorporation to increase the number of
authorized common shares or reduce the par value of the common shares.' 58
This section provides:
The holders of the outstanding shares of a class shall
be entitled to vote as a class upon a proposed amendment,
whether or not entitled to vote thereon by the certificate of
incorporation, if the amendment would increase or decrease
the aggregate number of authorized shares of such class,
increase or decrease the par value of the shares of such class,
or alter or change the powers, preferences, or special rights of
the shares of such class so as to affect them adversely. If any
proposed amendment would alter or change the powers,
preferences, or special rights of 1 or more series of any class
so as to affect them adversely, but shall not so affect the
152
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entire class, then only the shares of the series so affected by
the amendment shall be considered a separate class for the
purposes of this paragraph. The number of authorized shares
of any such class or classes of stock may be increased or
decreased (but not below the number of shares thereof then
outstanding) by the affirmative vote of the holders of a
majority of the stock of the corporation entitled to vote
irrespective of this subsection, if so provided in the original
certificate of incorporation, in any amendment thereto which
created such class or classes of stock or which was adopted
prior to the issuance of any shares of such class or classes of
stock, or in any amendment thereto which was authorized by
a resolution or resolutions adopted by the affirmative vote of
the holders of a majority of such class or classes of stock. 159
The fact that AIG issued preferred shares to the federal
government in this takeover does not exonerate this transaction from
section 242(b)(2) because the issued preferred shares were convertible
into common. 160 As section 242(b)(2) summarizes, authorizations of
this type of new shares requires current AIG common shareholders to
authorize the issuance. 16' This is something that shareholders of AIG
did not do prior to the issuance of the equity stake to the federal
government. 1
62
D. Was AIG "s Takeover in Violation of the Common Law Enunciated
by the Delaware Supreme Court in Hildreth v. Castle Dental
Centers, Inc. ?
In Hildreth v. Castle Dental Centers, Inc., the Delaware Supreme
Court ruled that preferred stock cannot convert into common stock if common
shareholders have not voted as a class to increase the number of authorized
shares of common stock.1 63 This is exactly the situation involved in AIG's
bailout: existing common shareholders have not been given a chance for a
separate and isolated vote on the issue of the government's preferred shares'
convertibility. 164 This common law holding simply adopts and enunciates the
159 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 242(b)(2) (2008), available at
http://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c00I /sc08/index.shtml.
160 Davidoff, supra note 94.
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proper interpretation of section 242(b)(2) of the Delaware General Corporation
Law. 165
The Court in Hildreth also found that a "[c]orporation's failure to seek
shareholder approval of charter amendment to increase the number of
authorized shares of common stock in order to enable full conversion of
preferred stock did not invalidate the preferred stock; the authorized share
failure did not nullify the original issuance of preferred stock.' 66 Therefore,
section 242(b)(2) cannot be used as an argument against issuance of the
preferred shares in the first place, but only against their convertibility issue. '
67
Even if a separate vote of existing AIG common shareholders is needed in
order to authorize conversion of the government's preferred shares into
common, this fact alone does not invalidate the issued preferred shares and the
remaining details of the bailout. 168 Furthermore, the government does have the
ability to coerce the existing AIG shareholders into voting for the conversion
by putting penalties in the loan documents if this issue is not approved.
69
Thus, through penalties, the government can effectively punish the AIG
shareholders for failure to approve the conversion aspect, to an economic
extent, worse than what they would face under the dilution of the common
shares when the preferred shares convert. 170 There is nothing under Delaware
law preventing the use of such coercion."'
Although the original bailout of AIG amounted to the largest bailout
of a private company in our history,172 recent developments have shown that it
was not enough to prevent failure of the company. 173 Furthermore, the terms of
the bailout, which were constructed under extreme time pressure, are still
being modified and interpreted. 1
74
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VIII. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Recently, it has become apparent that the initial loan to AIG was
inadequate to save the failing insurance company. 175 Both additional capital
and a modification of the initial interest rate have been provided to AIG in
order to prevent its bankruptcy. 176 Existing shareholder's rights, which were
not properly enunciated due to the urgency in making the first loan, are still in
debate. 1
77
A. Government Makes Modifications and Additional Loans to AIG
The initial bailout of AIG consisted of an $85 billion loan at LIBOR
plus 8.5% in which the government received a 79.9% stake in AIG along with
the ability to remove senior management. 178 The outstanding value this loan as
of November 19, 2008 was $60 billon, with the Federal Reserve receiving the
rights of a general creditor including senior security over AIG's unregulated
subsidiaries, but no real governance rights except for some negative covenants
limiting AIG's operations and expenditures.1 79 That said, the ability to veto
important expenditures of a private corporation is a significant power; a power
which is currently in the hands of government. 180
Under the now $60 billion initial loan, the preferred shares issued
under this loan are now referred to as 100,000 Series C preferred shares
convertible into a 77.9% of AIG's outstanding common stock. 181 This stock
has a vote equal to 77.9% of AIG's share capital and is entitled to the same
percentage of any dividends paid on AIG's common shares. 182 Therefore,
whoever controls these shares controls AIG. 1 83 Currently, the shares have been
issued to a trust (known as the AIG Credit Facility Trust) for the benefit of the
Treasury Department (so taxpayers receive the benefit of any repayment or
gains on the loan). 184 Under section 5.11 of the original credit agreement, the
three trustees for this trust will be appointed by the Federal Reserve, and AIG
"shall use all reasonable efforts to cause the composition of the board of
directors of AIG to be satisfactory to the Trust in its sole discretion." 185 The
175 Felsenthal, supra note 172.
176 Id.
177 Davidoff, supra note 94.
178 leva M. Augstums, AIG Repays More of $85 Billion Fed Loan, THE DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 10, 2008, available at
http://www.memphisdailynews.com/editorial/Article.aspx?id=39375.
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effect of this language is that the government is in voting control of AIG, and
such control does not appear to be authorized under Delaware statutory or
common law. 1
86
In addition to the original loan, weeks later it became apparent more
capital was needed by AIG, and the government lent an additional $37.8
billion as well as further assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP). 187 In exchange for these monies, the government is getting $40
billion of preferred shares carrying a 10% dividend, AIG's agreement to
restrictions on lobbying, limitations on executive compensation and bonus
pools for senior partners not to exceed 2007 and 2006 levels, and compliance
with an expense policy. 188 These preferred shares are non-voting except on
certain major issues affecting the preferred, such as if AIG misses divided
payments for four consecutive quarters; then the Treasury has the right under
the terms of this preferred stock to elect 20% of the total number of directors
after giving effect to such election. 
189
In addition to the existing loans, the government will buy up to $52.2
billion of AIG's troubled assets, mainly collateralized debt obligations
(CDO's) and residential mortgage-backed securities (MBS).' 90 The
government will also allow AIG access to the Federal Reserve's commercial
paper program, which is available to all companies that issued commercial
paper before the credit markets froze. '9 Under this program, AIG has access
to borrow up to $20.9 billion. 192 Furthermore, the original $85 billion loan rate
has been modified to a lower rate of LIBOR plus 3.0% after it became
apparent that AIG was continuing its demise under the weight of the prior,
more expensive terms. 193 As it stands, the government's total potential support
for AIG may be as high as $173 billion. 194 The size of this loan makes it the
largest bailout of a single company in the history of our government. 195 The
voting power giving to the government for consideration of their loan still
appears to be a violation of constitutional and Delaware law. 196
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B. Do Existing AIG Shareholders Get a Separate Vote on the
Government's Preferred Shares'
Convertibility Issue?
On Friday, November 7, 2008, there was a telephone conference in the
Delaware Chancery Court before Judge William B. Chandler III on the issues
surrounding AIG's bailout. 97 Of particular interest was the issue of the
convertibility of the issued preferred shares. 98 During this conference, AIG's
attorneys claimed that there would be a separate class vote among existing
common shareholders of AIG in order to approve the conversion of the federal
government's preferred shares into common. 99 This statement appears to be in
conflict with prior statements by AIG that explained that the preferred shares
issued to the government would also have a vote on the conversion issue.200
Since the preferred shares total a 79.9% equity stake in the company, the
government could simply decide by itself when and whether to convert its own
preferred shares into common. 20 1 However, according to AIG's attorney's
latest comments on this issue, it appears conversion may not be so easy for the
government, as existing common shareholders of AIG will get a separate vote
to approve or disprove of the convertibility issue on the government's
preferred shares.2 2 If the government maintains this position concerning the
convertibility of its preferred shares, such a compromise may effectively be
construed as an admission that the original terms of AIG's bailout were both
illegal and ineffective under constitutional and Delaware law.
C. When Will Governmental Control of AIG be Relinquished?
As it stands, there is no specified deadline for when the government
will sell its interest in AIG back to private shareholders.0 3 With the current
restructuring of the existing loans, the new bailout terms appear to make the
government more of a long-term investor, rather than a temporary savior of
AIG. 204 Along with traditional capitalistic view of the role of government in
the private economy, that is something that Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson
has stated he hoped to avoid.20 5
The Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department have said that the
federal government "intends to exit its support of AIG over time in a
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disciplined manner consistent with maximizing the value of its investments
and promoting financial stability. 20 6 Additionally, newly appointed CEO of
AIG, Edward Liddy, initially said that he believed "the Fed money would be
like water pouring into a bathtub - a lot might be needed at first, but
eventually the tub would be filled and the facet could be turned off.
'20 7
However, since this statement, AIG has continued to need more money than
was expected and it has not been able to sell off some of its assets and
subsidiaries fast enough to pay down the loan as required. 20 8
D. Even with Unprecedented Governmental Assistance, is AIG Still
Safe from Bankruptcy?
As government aid approaches $170 billion dollars,20 9 many are
beginning to worry if the government is simply throwing money down a black
hole.2t0 On Monday, November 11, 2008, AIG posted its largest quarterly loss
in the history of its eighty-nine years of incorporation at $24.5 billion.2 1' This
figure is in comparison to $3.09 billion of profit for the same period last
year.21 2 This third quarter loss is the fourth straight quarter of losses for AIG,
now totaling over $43 billion in losses over the past year. 21 3 AIG's market
value, once at $180 billion in 2007, has now been reduced to $5 billion. 214
Now that the government has effectively issued $170 billion of aid to AIG,21 5
AIG's problems are now our problems, and the same question continues to
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IX. CONCLUSION:
CONTROVERSY REMAINS SURROUNDING THE TERMS OF AIG's
FEDERAL BAILOUT
As AIG's federal bailout terms continue to evolve, it is clear that the
21
controversy surrounding this deal is not likely to end anytime soon. 2 6 Part of
the delay is due simply to the fact that the deal was structured awkwardly and
in terms not easily understood upon first glance. More importantly, the Federal
Reserve still has not proven that its actions surrounding the bailout were in
accordance with the powers granted under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act. 217 Furthermore, AIG's existing shareholders did not receive a class voting
right concerning the issue of the government's preferred shares'
convertibility.2 8 The absence of such vote is a clear violation of both
Delaware statutory and common law. 219 Although the government may be
changing its stance considering its eligibility for a conversion right,220 Wilma
Walker will not be the first plaintiff suing AIG and the federal government
over this deal.22' Common shareholders of AIG were undeniably hurt from the
substantial drop in AIG's share price following the news of massive dilution
from the government's equity stake. This issue will likely not be settled for
several years to come.
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